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بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

ရိုဟင်ဂျာ မျိုးချစ် တပ်ဦး جبهة روهينغيا الوطنية
 .. دودھانگ .. زکات .. بورما ..

ROHINGYA PATRIOTIC FRONT
 ROANG (ARAKAN)
 BURMA.

Ref. No. RPF P & I-1/05-86/(PR).

Date 9/2/1986.

PRESS RELEASE

RPF CONDEMNS BURMESE UNION DAY MOOT

The Burmese regime is preparing to observe the 39th Anniversary of Union Day on February 12,1986 with the aim of national unity. It follows from the Panlong Conference that was held on the 12th February, 1947 in Shan State,Burma under the leadership of Bogyoke Aung San. The Conference was committed to establish the country under the Federal system of government in which the rights of the minorities are guaranteed.

The so called Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma today is collectively inhabited and owned by the Kachins,Karennis,Karens,Chins,Poas,Palaungs, Was , Lahus,Mons,Shans,Burmese,Rohingyas and other nationals etc. Though Burma gained its independence in 1948,the successive rulers from Anti Facist Peoples Freedom League(AFPPL) to Burma Socialist Programme Party(BSPP) with their chauvinistic policies have been exercising reactionary political,economical,racial and military practices resulting in the pro government communal riots for over 36 years and the peoples of the whole country are writhing in agony,under the rigors and devastations of the riots.

At present, Ne Win - BSPP military government has plunged the civil war into deep mire by oppressing the masses of the people politically,exploiting them economically,subjugating and assimilating the indigenous races racially and attacking them militarily.

During the parliamentary democratic government rule Rohingyas established all their rights and prevlleges in the Burmese Assembly. The Rohingyas were able to send their representatives to both Upper and Lower Houses through election. Late Mr. Abdul Gaffar, Late Mr.Sultan Ahmed, Late Mr.Abdus Sobhan,Mr. Abul Bashar, Mr. Rashid Ahmed, Late Mr.Abul Khair, Late Mr.Sultan Mahmood,Late Mr.Nasiruddin (U Po Khine)Mrs.Zuhura Begum (Daw Aye Nyunt)were the members of Parliment in different terms. When dictator Ne Win came in power in 1962 he dissolved the Parliment and formed Burmese style of Socialist Planning Party(BSPP).

On Rohingya News Broadcasting Service was also introduced in the Burma Broadcasting Service(BBS)Rangoon in 1959 and was relayed thrice a week at 17:30 hours Burma Standard time(B.S.T)from 162,67,26 and 17 meter bands.

Since Ne Win took over the power in 1962, the country has been running with despotic rule,where even basic democracy has totally been extincted. He declared Rohingyas rights as unvalid in Burma and thus abandoned all their rights and previleges.

To day the Ne Win regime is warring against the national minorities in violation of the commitment framed at the Panlong Conference. The national minorities are compelled to form their own rebellion groups to safe-guard their rights side by side along with Rohingya Patriotic Front Army,the vanguard of oppressed Rohingya people,Karen National Liberation Army(KNLA),Kachin Independence Army (KIA),Shan United Army(SUA),Shan United Revolutionary Army(SURA),Palaung State Liberation Army(PSLA),Shan State Army(SSA),Pa-O National Army(PNA),Lahu National United Army(LNUA),Zomi Independence Army(ZIA) and Mon Newland Party(MNP) are in active with their fighting forces.

In the circumstance as stated above the view of the Burma Union Day celebration contradicts the essence of Panglong Conference. There can be no peace and stability in Burma without Federal System of Government in full co-operation of the minorities..

The Front severely condemns the evil motives of the Burmese regime,because the meaning of Panglong Conference has lost its true spirit and principle. The Union Day of the Union of Burma must be termed as Disunion Bay,because of the mockery of majority Buddhist on non-Buddhist minorities.


Bro. Muhammad Ali
Vice-President,
R P F .



Central Executive Committee
Rohingya Patriotic Front
Roang(Arakan),
BURMA .

" Wanting to survive , we may do more than we have to do . That is the surest way to survive. But the surest way NOT to survive is to do less than we have to do ."

Senator Millard Tydings - U.S.A.

WHO REALLY KILLED AUNG SAN?

(From Our Rangoon Correspondent)

The mysterious assassination of Burma's Prime Minister Aung San in July 1947 was one of the major turning points in the Karen struggle for liberation. Although 39 years have passed, the real plotters of the murder have never been identified in public. The facts in the case have never been settled.

Strong evidence exists that the trial and conviction of U Saw was a frame-up, designed to turn attention from the real conspirators. If U Saw was framed, who really murdered Burma's independence leader? Is there any truth to persisting rumours that General Ne Win, Prime Minister U Nu and others may have been involved?

The story begins in the closing days of World War II when Aung San was promised independence by Lord Mountbatten. Many conservative Englishmen resented Mountbatten's decision, because Aung San had collaborated with the Japanese. Karens who fought side-by-side with British officers had been assured that their yearning for autonomy would be fulfilled after the war. But the new Labour Government of Prime Minister Atlee had its hands full and wanted to free itself of the burden of Burma as quickly as possible. A lot of promises were forgotten.

In Burma, the hopes of the Minorities were sidestepped by political tricks and double-talk. During the Panglong Conference in March 1947, the Burmans and some of their British friends prevented the true representatives of the Karens and other Minorities from attending. False representatives were sent instead. These men betrayed their own people by doing only what the Burmans told them. The Karen people objected strongly to this treachery, and boycotted the elections held that April. It became clear to Aung San that civil war would break out the moment the British left. To avoid this, Aung San planned to go against the will of U Nu, Ne Win and other hardline Burmans, and make major concessions to the Karens and other Minorities. Before he could act, his enemies cut him down.

That is where the facts become obscured by further treachery. The truth becomes clear only when each fact is examined closely.

On June 17, 1947, Aung San hinted that he was preparing to make these dramatic concessions when he told the Constituent Assembly "the Union should consist of specified Autonomous Units-with adequate safeguards for Minorities."

A few days later, U Tin Tut flew to England as foreign minister to arrange the final transfer of power. He was followed to London by a separate group consisting of the hardliners U Nu, Kyaw Nyein and Bo Khin Maung Galay. These three men were known to be strongly opposed to granting concessions to the Minorities. (U Nu stated a few months later, "I am cent per cent against the

operation of Autonomous states for Karens, Mons and Arakanese.") For their own reasons, they were determined to keep all of Burma under Rangoon's thumb. Kyaw Nyein was a businessman and king-maker who knew that large foreign investment would come to Burma only if there was a strong central government. As one British banker put it at the time. "Till Burma becomes credit-worthy, they cannot expect anyone to lend them capital ... and the more they split up the less credit-worthy they become." Granting autonomy to the Karens and other Minorities would endanger all Kyaw Nyein's plans for big construction projects.

So while U Tin Tut was reassuring Prime Minister Atlee and other Labour Government leaders that Aung San was about to make peace with the Karens, the three hardline Burmans were busy seeking urgent help from more conservative British groups. There had to be a way to prevent Aung San from giving in to the Karens. Naturally, there were some powerful men in England who wanted to even the score with Aung San. Because of the strong political divisions in England, these powerful conservatives were in a position to act secretly without the knowledge of the Labour Party leaders.

Early in July 1947, the Assistant Commissioner of Police in Rangoon, Michael Busk, a former Chindit, learned that sixty Bren guns were missing from the armoury. It was suspected that these guns had been stolen by certain British army officers to sell to enemies of Aung San's new government. Busk urged that extra security precautions should go into effect at the Secretariat in Rangoon, Aung San rejected the proposal, saying that he felt secure in the affection of his people. The police asked for a warrant to search the house of former prime minister U Saw, who was one of Aung San's leading opponents. This warrant was turned down on political grounds.

The District Superintendent of Police in Insein, where U Saw lived, was Saw Sein Hmon. He received orders to keep U Saw under surveillance because of suspicion that he was buying stolen guns from two British officers, Major Campbell and Major Young. He detailed police teams to keep watch around the clock. They were to take note of every movement in and out of the house, every car and number plate, and follow each car. From July 15 to July 19 not one outside car drove into the compound.

According to records in the India Office in London, "Aung San was informed by (British) C.I.D. of a plot against the Ministers for 20 July." (General Sir Neil Ritchie communicated this fact to Field Marshall Montgomery in August of that year.)

On July 18, Captain Lilley of the Union Military Police told Company

Commander Lieutenant Saw Yoshoo in Amhearst District that his company was to stand on alert because Aung San was to be assassinated the next day. Saw Yoshoo never forgot those peculiar instructions.

On the morning of July 19, Saw Sein Hmon said he was ordered to arrest U Saw. That is all he was told. No charges were given. Saw Sein Hmon went to the house immediately and said he arrested U Saw at exactly 9 a.m. At the time, he said U Saw was doing nothing unusual, only spending the morning with members of his family.

At 10 a.m. On July 19, one hour after U Saw was arrested at his home in Insein. Aung San and most of his Cabinet were meeting in the Secretariat to discuss what to do about the plot reported by the C.I.D). They were considering making a number of precautionary arrests. Because of the police strike underway in Rangoon, roadblocks were already in place on all roads leading into the city. Only one road had been overlooked, a small lane behind the university. In the room with Aung San were Thakin Mya and U Ba Win (both Burmans), Deedok Ba Cho (a Shan/Burman), Sao San Htun (the Shan Sawbwa of Mongpaw), Abdul Bazak (a Moslem) and Mahn Ba Khaing (a Karen). Several members of the Cabinet were not at the meeting.

Down the hall outside the Cabinet room came a man with a tommy gun, His name was Ba Nyunt. He had entered the city on the one road that did not have a roadblock, the lane behind the university. He stopped in front of a half-door and looked into an office next to the Cabinet room. He later told police that he saw U Nu inside praying. He told one policeman, "I was not supposed to shoot the man who was praying."

Ba Nyunt then went to the next door. At exactly 10:15 a.m. - one hour and fifteen minutes after the arrest of U Saw - he burst into the room where the Cabinet meeting was taking place, and shot dead Aung San and the six men with him.

News of the shootings reached Assistant Superintendent of Police Michael Busk immediately. The assassin was captured and interrogated immediately. Busk said later, "I thought it rather odd that the assassin claimed that he had looked over the half door of his room and did not shoot Thakin Nu because he was praying..."

Suspicion was immediately directed at U Saw. He was a rival of Aung San and had refused to associate himself with the Atlee agreement granting independence to Burma. Everyone knew he was no friend of Aung San. U Saw had made no secret of it. According to the "official history" of the assassination, and stories put out to every Rangoon newspaper, police went to U Saw's house at 5 p.m. on the day of the killings, where they claimed that they found him "celebrating the murders with

his followers." In fact, District Commissioner Saw Sein Hmon had arrested U Saw at exactly 9 that morning - one hour and fifteen minutes before the assassination. (The official version was suspicious for another reason. If the murder had really been carried out by U Saw's henchmen and the killer had been captured, would U Saw really throw a party at his home to celebrate the murder, and wait there for police to come?)

According to the "official history" the missing bren guns were found dumped in a pond near U Saw's home. Superintendent Busk said, "It made no sense." In other words, if U Saw had bought these stolen guns as part of a plot to murder Aung San, why were they not passed out to his supporters? Why were they dumped in a pond by his house? Was it arranged that way in order to implicate U Saw?

The tommy guns used in the murder were said to have been "found" in U Saw's house when police went there at 5 p.m. They were not part of the group of stolen bren guns. The murder weapons were traced by their serial numbers to two British army officers, Captain Vivian and Major Young. It is suspicious that the murder weapons were "found" in the last place U Saw would ever put them. Why would he keep them in his house when all the other weapons were dumped in the pond? Also, how did the murder weapons get to U Saw's house at 5 p.m. If police were lying about arresting U Saw at 5 p.m. could they also have lied about finding the murder weapons at his house? when U Saw himself was arrested more than an hour before the assassination?

Superintendent Busk personally arrested Captain Vivian. The Welshman was never tried for his involvement in the murder because he was freed from Insein Prison when the Karen forces took Insein town in February the next year. (Vivian made his way back safely to England and spent the rest of his life in a small town in southern Wales.)

Major Young was brought to trial at the same time as U Saw. But when U Saw testified that he had never bought weapons from Major Young, the Englishman was acquitted. His acquittal was very peculiar because it had already been established that the killer used guns obtained from Major Young. Therefore, he was an accessory to murder. Was Young innocent because the U Nu government wanted U Saw to be guilty? Also, if the court believed U Saw about not buying guns from Young, why did it refuse to believe anything else he said?

At the trial in December 1947, U Saw was to be defended by a distinguished British barrister, Mr. P. H. Curtis-Bennett, K.C. Mr. Curtis-Bennett came to Rangoon prepared to prove that U Saw was the scapegoat for a crime he did not commit. But when he discovered that the court proceedings were rigged, Mr. Curtis

Bennett walked out in disgust. He charged that the court was biased, and that all the witnesses had changed their testimony because they had been corrupted. He returned bitterly to England.

Aung San's own family did not believe the official version. On September 14, two months after the assassination, Aung San's brother-in-law, Thakin Than Tun, stormed into the Officer's Club on Sule Pagoda Road in Rangoon and shouted, "U Saw did not kill Aung San: it was you British who were behind it all." He then smashed every bottle in the Club till he was taken away by Military Police. Subsequently, Thakin Than Tun went underground and led the first Major rebellion in Burma to overthrow the U Nu / Ne Win / Kyaw Nyein alliance, who he felt had betrayed the nation.

U Nu later denied that he had been praying in the room next to where the murders had taken place. He claimed that he had been nowhere near the scene. But immediately after Aung San's death, Governor Sir Hubert Rance was persuaded that U Nu was the senior surviving Cabinet Minister who should head the new government. Only three hours after the murders, U Nu was able to present Rance with a complete list of his new Cabinet. This was remarkably quick for a man who claimed to have been shaken by the assassination.

Both Mr. Curtis-Bennett and U Saw charged repeatedly that the trial was not legally valid according to British law, which then applied. (1) U Saw was jailed first and only charged several months later. (2) He was tried by a special tribunal although the High Court was functioning, which was improper. (5) He was deprived of his right to appeal to the Privy Council.

As Mr. Curtis-Bennett had charged, the assassin, Ba Nyunt, also changed his original story. At the trial he turned "king's evidence" - thus earning a reprieve from the death penalty. He now denied ever seeing U Nu praying in the room next to his victims. In the "official history," it is claimed that three men were not anywhere near the scene of the assassination: U Nu, Kyaw Nyein, and Bo Khin Maung Galay.

Ten days after the murders, police received a tip to look in the pond near U Saw's house for the licence plates of the two cars used in the assassination. The two number plates were found exactly there. It is suspicious that Saw Sein Hmon's police units had kept this house under surveillance for many days and no cars, including the cars used in the assassination, came anywhere near the house. How did the plates get in the pond?

Saw Sein Hmon said he thought there was a good case of treason against U Saw because of his general anti-government activities. But he insisted that he never

once believed that U Saw had anything to do with the assassination. How could he, when he was already under arrest before it occurred? Saw Sein Hmon believed that other men were behind the assassination. When he made his theories known, he was transferred overnight to Pegu district far away from the scene.

Then there is the strange case of Colin Tooke, Superintendent of Police in Rangoon. Tooke joined the Burma Police in 1933 and was stationed in Rangoon at the time of the assassination. He was suspicious of the case prepared against U Saw. He was convinced that U Saw was being framed. Superintendent Tooke began keeping a secret file of his own. As a precaution, he kept the secret file in his own home, which was guarded by a fierce Alsatian dog. One evening he went home and was told by a servant that the dog had suddenly begun to foam at the mouth. Fearing that the dog had rabies, the servants shot it and dumped his body in the river.

Tooke was suspicious because rabies does not develop so suddenly. He went to the river, recovered the body of his dog, and had an autopsy performed. The dog did not have rabies. Something else had caused it to go into convulsions. He was convinced that his dog had been poisoned. When he returned home, Tooke found that his house had been broken into and his secret file had been stolen. Now he was seriously alarmed, and began pursuing his investigation intensely. Several months later, in 1948, his sudden death was reported. The cause of death was identified as Landry's Acute Paralysis. This is a mysterious paralysis of the body that is caused by a toxin, or poison. Tooke's colleagues thought his death was accidental because they did not know he was conducting a secret investigation of Aung San's assassination.

Another man who believed that U Saw was being framed was Foreign Minister U Tin Tut. During the months following the murders, and during the trial of U Saw, U Tin Tut began to realize that somebody else had plotted Aung San's death. In August 1948, soon after Tooke was poisoned, U Tin Tut broke with U Nu and resigned as Foreign Minister. One month later a bomb was thrown into his car and he was murdered.

Obviously, many questions remain unanswered about Aung San's assassination. A great effort has been made to cover up. U Saw was only a scapegoat. But to determine who was really responsible, we must ask who benefitted. Because of Aung San's death, U Nu became prime minister overnight. Because of Aung San's death, Burma remained under Rangoon's thumb, foreign investment came, and Kyaw Nyein became the richest man in Burma. But who had all the facilities, the men, and the experience in organizing and carrying out the machine gun murders of opposition leaders? Because of Aung San's murder, the Karens were forced into

rebellion and all senior Karen officers were gradually forced out of the Ministry of Defense. In the vacuum, Ne Win got his reward. He was appointed Chief of Staff and then Defense Minister.

The unholy alliance of U Nu, Kyaw Nyein and Ne Win then became clear. Just as in the assassination of the American President John F. Kennedy, there has been a great cover-up. After 39 years, it is time for justice to be done.

PEACE THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS

It has been the policy of the Karen National Union (KNU) to advocate liberty, equality and peace and it will always be so.

The Karens received a "raw deal" from the British government of Attlee though they had served the British interest with greatest of loyalty during the British colonial rule of Burma and during World War II. For their loyalty to the British, thousands of Karen civilians were killed and persecuted during WW II by the Burmese nationalists who took advantage of their alliance with the Japanese and the ignorance of the occupying Japanese army about the communal situation in the country.

An interesting side light to the situation that led to a "raw deal" for the Karens was the findings of a British scholar who is doing research on the history of Burma during the decades following WW II. According to his views the "raw deal" was the result of a conspiracy hatched by some British officials of the Foreign Affairs Department and the executives of British business companies operating in Burma. In order to get better concessions from the Burmese politicians for business operations in post-independence Burma, they prevented the legitimate demands of the Karen leaders from reaching the British policy makers. Apparently, the British policy makers were fed with the Burmese lies about the Karens. The Karen leaders repeatedly voiced about their fear of the dire consequences that might follow if their appeals were ignored. Time and again, the British urged them to throw in their lot with the Burmese. On January 4, 1948, the British handed all the reins of political to the Burmese politicians.

On February 11, 1948, peaceful and orderly demonstrations by the Karens organized by the KNU were held all over the country. About half a million out of a population of 5 million Karens participated in those demonstrations. Their desire for liberty, equality and peace was declared on the placards they were carrying. The placards read:

- (i) Give the Karen state at once

- (ii) Show Burmese one kyat Karens one kyat at once
- (iii) We do not want communal strife
- (iv) We do not want civil war

After independence, the Burmese response to the Karen's search for liberty, equality and peace was the inflammatory charges in the Burmese press. The pocket army of the Burmese party in power, the Anti-Facist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), started attacking and burning isolated Karen villages. Leaders of KNU urged the Karen people for restraint. Taking the Karens' restraint for timidity, the Burmese levies increased their attacks, committing murder, pillage, arson and rape. Finally, when the Karens took up arms in self - defence, the AFPFL government declared the Karen National Defence Organization, a militia organization under KNU, as an unlawful association on January 30, 1949. From then onward, the suppression of the Karen national movement went into full gear. Many Karen leaders were thrown into gaol. Many Karen officers and men in the armed forces were disarmed and held in detention camps. When the Karen uprising became widespread and the Karens captured a number towns and cities in the Irrawaddy delta and the lower part of Burma in their stunning military victories, the Burmese resorted to the combination of brute force with cunning.

They supplied the CPB and other leftist organisations with arms to fight against the Karens. The leaders of other indigenous races were bribed with money and high positions to oppose the Karens. They call for negotiation to buy time and etc.

Throughout the civil war, the KNU tried to settle the conflict by political and peaceful means. On three occasions the KNU tried to negotiate peace with successive Burmese governments. The first was in 1949 with U Nu's AFPFL government. The second in 1960 with General Ne Win's care-taker government and the third in 1963 with General Ne Win's Revolutionary Council. On all of these occasions, the Burmese demanded unconditional surrender and refused to talk on the questions of liberty, equality and peace.

The KNU, as always, does not desire the prolongation of the civil war. The utmost desire of the KNU is to create a genuine Federal Union of Republics based on liberty, equality and social progress for all the indigenous races of the country.

The statement issued by the KNU following the 9th Congress of the 7th Central Standing Committee meeting clearly states, "if Ne Win's BSPP military regime should have sincere and honest desire for the national unity of all indigenous races and thereupon, lasting internal peace, the BSPP should resolve the issues with the revolutionary forces fighting for their national liberation,

through political means".

In trying to achieve peace through political means, the KNU will hold fast to the four principles laid down by the beloved leader of the Karen people, the late President Saw Ba U Gyi:-

- (i) For us surrender is out of the question
- (ii) The recognition of the Karen State must be completed
- (iii) We shall retain our arms
- (iv) We will decide our own political destiny

* * * * *

INTERVIEW WITH INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS EXPERT

Starting from last year, the Burmese diplomatic activities seem to have gone into top gear requiring dictator Ne Win, head of state San Yu and head of government Maung Maung Kha to go out on foreign visits more frequently than at any other time. Our special correspondent took time out to have an interview with an international relations expert at the National Democratic Front (NDF) headquarters in Manerplaw, Kawthoolei, to learn about his views of those activities. The excerpts of the interview are given below.

C:(correspondent) How do you view Rangoon's vigorous attempts to improve relations with the other countries?

E: (expert) It is rather unusual for a government that has been following an isolationist policies. Basically, the men in power in Rangoon are a proud lot with a vain-glorious idea of themselves. Now they are grovelling at the feet of the others. The reason is not far to see. Rangoon has been facing serious economic difficulties for more than a decade due to its wrong economic policy and misrule. The failure of its all-out effort, begun in 1948, to crush the national liberation movements of the indigenous peoples in the country has compounded its problems. The economic difficulties have now assumed a crisis proportion causing serious dissensions among its own followers and severely damaging the morale of its armed forces which have been the very foundation of its power. By heightening diplomatic activities, Rangoon is trying to divert the attention of the people from the internal problems.

C: Couldn't it be possible that Rangoon was trying to create more than a diversion?

E: It is possible that by diplomatic means Rangoon is trying to under-cut the positions of the national liberation movement in Burma. Rangoon has been

harbouring the illusion that some countries are lending help and support to the national liberation movements. The fact is that none of the national liberation movements has received anything from the outside. Had there been any aid and support, the revolution of the indigenous people in Burma would have finished off the regime in Rangoon long ago.

C: Do you foresee something like a massive foreign aid for Rangoon to suppress the national liberation movements?

E: No, nothing of the sort. The world has come to realize the justness of the cause of the national liberation movements in Burma. All civilized countries have a finely-tuned sense of justice and political propriety. They want to see peace in Burma, but they know that peace has to be based on freedom for all the indigenous peoples in the country and justice. What Rangoon needs is a thorough self-examination with a sincere will to find the truth. If it does that it will find it has only itself to blame for all the troubles in the country.

C: What significant gains are likely to be made by Rangoon with its diplomatic initiatives?

E: International relations of substance are based on mutual benefits in areas of trade, technology, culture and above all security and trust. Rangoon has nothing much to offer in any of these matters. Rangoon's deplorable records of the treatment of the indigenous peoples of Burma should make anyone very cautious.

C: What should Rangoon do to have a genuine improvement of relations with other countries?

E: Firstly, Rangoon has to realize peace based on justice and freedom by adopting a policy of sincere respect for the rights of all the indigenous peoples in the country to self-determination, equality and social progress. Then it has to establish democracy and build up the country's economy. Only then it will have something to offer for any meaningful international relationship.

C: Do you see that happening in the immediate future?

E: Not very likely. The present Burmese leadership is the very embodiment of the Burmese chauvinist mania for conquest and domination. It is bent on the eventual elimination of all the indigenous peoples in the country by war and assimilation by force. Burmese history, regarded more as a collection of myths by others, says that the Burmese kings had built a Burmese empire three times in the past. Whether it is true or not, the indigenous peoples in the country have never felt themselves to be part of anything Burmese. Historically, the

Burmese regarded all the indigenous peoples as barbarians to be bullied and exploited at will. On the other hand, the indigenous peoples regarded the Burmese as blood-thirsty murderers and plunderers to be hated and resisted at all costs. Only when the British arrived, proper borders were set up, peace was established and the Burmese and the other indigenous peoples in the country were brought into closer contact by more or less the same administrative and social systems. Even then, the Burmese and the other indigenous peoples remained isolated from one another psychologically and physically in most cases. In this context, any attempt by the Burmese leadership to dominate the indigenous peoples, as it is now, is bound to be strongly resisted and there can be no peace in the country. I regret that I see very little likelihood of the present Burmese leadership relinquishing the policy of domination or hegemony towards the other indigenous peoples in the country.

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THE KAREN REVOLUTION AND THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS

AGING STRONGMAN NE WIN KEEPS GRIP ON BURMA

By T.R. Lanser
London Observer Service


RANGOON. Burma — The Oct. 6 elections for Burma's Phitu Hlu Haw, or People's Assembly generated little excitement, or even interest, among Burma's 38 million people.

The only vote they were able to cast was a yes or no on candidates selected by the country's ruling, and only, political party, the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP). And even their chance to vote "no" was dubious — BSPP workers were at all polling stations, some of which featured the simple method of walking through one of two doors marked yes and no.

In other stations, a screen not reaching to the floor supposedly "shielded" voters' privacy, but yes and no boxes were far apart, and voters complained, "You need a very long arm to vote 'no.'"

BURMA'S UNDISPUTED strongman is 74-year-old Ne Win. BSPP chairman, who as army chief of staff in 1962 seized power in a coup. Most of the government's top officials are ex-military men.

The iconoclastic policies of the eccentric and wildly unpredictable dictator have led a country with rich resources and high potential for economic development to the verge of bankruptcy. Diplomats in Rangoon estimate the country's foreign exchange reserves to have dropped below \$30 million, and the debt-serv-



Christian Science Monitor map

ice ratio on foreign loans of \$36 billion to be climbing towards 50 percent.

Strict government controls have blocked economic growth, and led to a flourishing and tacitly tolerated black market. Nearly every tourist arriving in Burma for the seven-day visit allowed by the government carries whisky and cigarettes which are snapped up by eager entrepreneurs even before leaving the airport. Watches, electronic goods, and luxury items usually brought in illegally by seamen through Rangoon's port fill shops along the main boulevard and in markets.

But far more serious for the average Burmese is the severe shortage of everyday staples

such as rice and cooking oil. Gasoline can cost up to nine times the official price of 50 cents a gallon, beer three times the regulation 90 cents a bottle.

FOR THE foreign visitor who can change his hard cash at about eight times the government's bank rate, Burma is still a bargain, but the economic duress has given many young people a glum view of their own futures.

"I will go to university, but what then is there for me?" a student said. "We cannot go overseas, we cannot go into private enterprise, and a lower division government clerk earns only \$16 a month. If I drink two bottles of beer a week, my salary will be finished."

Despite such widespread unhappiness, Ne Win's rule seems in no way threatened, if only because of a reportedly pervasive system of informers and the ruthlessness which people recall past demonstrations met. Fighting against rebel minority groups, especially along the Thai frontier also poses no threat to the regime, but is a severe drain on the country's meager income.

About 40 percent of Burma's budget goes to support the 185,000-man military, though the force remains woefully under-equipped with 1950s vintage weapons. It is estimated that only half of its 40 helicopters are serviceable at any given time, and even these aren't used on the front lines for fear of being shot down.

"Everybody from the chief of staff downwards understands the country can afford few of the items they see in the glossy brochures

brought around by the arms dealers," a diplomat in Rangoon commented.

THE PREPONDERANCE of ex-generals at the top doesn't give much hope that the preference for military solutions will soon be abandoned. And Ne Win's advanced age and reportedly frail health hasn't forced him to slacken his grip on the reigns of power, or does he seem about to change direction from his Burmese road to socialism'.

"The BSPP congress (in August) acknowledged that the economy is in a terrible mess and they decided to follow those policies which got them into this mess. It's really a testament to the extent to which Ne Win still holds absolute power," a Western analyst said.

But at 74, the irascible leader — who has been known to slap and pummel senior ministers and generals during official functions — seems to be grooming a successor. San U, 67, described as "not charismatic, but a straight-forward and honest, uncomplicated and respected ex-general" by diplomatic sources, has taken over the vice-chairmanship of the BSPP as well as his post as the country's president, a position far less important in the Burmese order of precedence.

After Ne Win dies, though, there might be a period of collective leadership, and few quick changes are likely. "In Burma, it's virtually a crime to show ambition and initiative," commented a diplomat. "Here, the nail that sticks up gets hammered down."

A WORD OF THANKS TO THE READERS

We are very grateful to the readers who have responded to our request with contribution, advice and encouragement. We look forward to enjoying the same support and good-will of our readers in the future as well.

Once again, we have to beg the indulgence of the readers for being late in bringing out the present issue. We are now able to give an address that can be used for the purpose of sending contribution or correspondence through normal mailing. We hope that we will be able to give an additional address later, for the convenience of readers in Asia, Australia and Africa.

Tee Set Mae Ywa Press,

C/o Mr. K. Lorenz,

SLO, SRF Office, P.O. Box 61081,

Manoa Valley, Honolulu, Hawaii 96822 .

CONSOLIDATED REPORT OF OWN KNU ACTIVITIES FOR THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY/ MARCH 1986

| MILITARY ZONE | OWN ACTIONS | | ENEMY CASUALTIES | | | | | ENEMY MATERIAL LOSSES | | | | | | REMARKS | | |
|---------------|-------------|------------|------------------|---------|-------------|----------|-----------|-----------------------|--------|------------|-----------|--------|--------------|---------|-------------|---|
| | ATTACKS | LAND MINES | KILLED | WOUNDED | LTC SEVERED | CAPTURED | SURRENDER | TOTAL | PISTOL | SMALL ARMS | MAGAZINES | AMMOS. | BOMBS/SHELLS | | CARS/TRUCKS | BRIDGES |
| NO. 1 | 17 | - | 24 | 18 | - | 2 | - | 44 | - | 14 | 16 | 340 | - | 2 | 2 | Among Enr killed were Maj. Khin Mg Hla, 2 council members, 1 militia Ldr & 4 NCO's, |
| NO. 2 | 2 | - | 2 | 5 | - | - | - | 7 | - | - | - | - | - | 2 | 2 | Captured some military equipments at Lergiko. |
| NO. 3 | 3 | - | 4 | 1 | - | - | - | 5 | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| NO. 4 | 13 | - | 17 | 35 | - | - | - | 52 | 1 | 12 | 12 | 180 | - | - | - | 22 local made guns also captd |
| NO. 5 | 19 | 2 | 49 | 128 | - | - | - | 177 | 1 | 5 | 21 | 2775 | 146 | - | - | Among Enr kld were 4 officers, 3 NCO's. Among wdd were 1 Technical Op. Comdr, 2 Colm Comdrs, 5 NCO's. |
| NO. 6 | 24 | 28 | 37 | 108 | 19 | - | 1 | 146 | - | - | - | - | - | 4 | - | Among Enr killed were 5 Officers, 2 NCO's & 3 NCO's wdd. |
| 20 Bn. | 20 | 2 | 41 | 43 | - | 3 | - | 84 | 14 | 42 | 3581 | 29 | 1 | 1 | 1 | Destroyed 3 electrical pylons, 3 Officers, 3 NCO's among Enr killed. Destroyed 3 barracks. |
| 101 Bn. | 8 | 4 | 14 | 17 | 1 | - | - | 31 | - | - | - | - | 4 | 1 | 2 | - |
| G HQ | 6 | 10 | 37 | 191 | 7 | - | - | 228 | 3 | - | - | - | - | - | - | 3 Capt & 2 NCO's among killed, 3 officers, 5 NCO's among wdd |
| Total | 112 | 67 | 261 | 571 | 28 | 5 | 1 | 1113 | 2 | 48 | 91 | 6876 | 179 | 9 | 6 | - |

REMARKABLE SUCCESSES SCORED BY OUR TROOPS

The following is a detailed account of some of our KNLA's remarkable success in its actions against the enemy in the months of February and March.

No. 1 Military Zone, Thaton District

On 24-2-86, a section of our troops with Village Defence forces attacked the enemy at Kalauk-in. One enemy corporal was wounded. Three houses of the enemy council members were burnt down.

On the same day, a second group of our troops attacked the enemy at Shwe-yaung-pya village. The enemy troops fled after 4 of them were killed and 6 wounded. Our troops captured 2 .303 enfield rifles.

A truck carrying the enemy reinforcement hit our land mine. The truck was totally destroyed and all the (17) enemy troops on the truck including one Maj. Khin Maung Hla were killed on the same day.

A guerilla detachment, on the same day attacked the enemy troops from No. 113 Light Infantry Regiment (LIR) at Kluserpoli and killed 2 enemy troops.

No, 5 Military Zone Area. No. 6 Bde.

On 10-2-86, a special company from our No. 16 Bn combined forces with one company of Karen National Defence Organization (KNDO) and ambushed an enemy column from No. 9 LIR at Hsaw-pra inflicting a casualty of 12 troops killed and 13 wounded on the enemy. Our troops captured 1 G2 rifle with 3 magazines and 130 rounds and some military equipment.

On 18-2-86, our KNDO troops and Village Defence volunteers ambushed the enemy near Kyee-ok inflicting a casualty of 6 enemy troops killed, including one officer, and 8 wounded.

On 28-2-86, a task force from our No. 16 Bn with a platoon of GHQ troops attacked the enemy near Nya-ei-ka village. The battle lasted the whole day and night. The enemy fled after suffering 18 killed, including one officer, and 40 wounded. Our troops captured one 9mm Browning pistol, one G4 rifle with 13 magazines and 400 rounds, one .30 carbine magazine and 17 rounds, 15 2-inch mortar shells, 30 60mm mortar shells, 2 BZK rocket rounds, 2000 G3 rifle rounds, 50 back packs and a quantity of other military equipment. In the battle, No, 2 column commander of the enemy 7 LIR and No. 1 column commander of No. 32 Infantry Bn were wounded.

On 25-3-86, our troops attacked enemy No. 31 and No. 61 Infantry Bns at KLe' Tagun/Tandawgyi. The battle lasted 1 hour 15 minutes after which the enemies retreated after suffering over 70 casualties, including 1 Coy. Comd. killed. We captured 5, 81mm shells and 9 60mm shells, 2 carbine magazines with 50 round ammunition.

20th Battalion Area, Papun District

On 12-2-86, Tadowah Column from our 20th Bn and GHQ Special Forces attacked the enemy at Say-day mine area in northern Papun. The battle lasted the whole day. The enemy suffered a total of 17 dead and 24 wounded. Among the wounded were 3 officers.

Our troops captured 2 156 W/T sets, 1 battery charger, 6 G3 rifles, 2 G4 rifles with 32 magazines and 3125 rounds, 2 sten guns with 10 magazines and 306 rounds, 150 rounds of .30 carbine, 21 hand grenades and a quantity of military equipment.

General Headquarters (GHQ) Area

On 28-3-86, the enemy troops from Nos. 75, 79 and 84 Infantry Bns of the No. 66 Division attacked our GHQ defence positions in Nawta, Umuki and Padu areas.

The enemy had to make a hasty retreat on the afternoon of 3-4-86. In the 5 days of battle, the enemy suffered a total of 29 killed, including one captain and 2 NCOs, and 187 wounded, including 3 officers and a number of NCOs.

There were 39 civilians, who had been forced by the enemy to serve as porters, among the casualty

* * * * *

BATTLE NEWS FOR APRIL 1986 (Incomplete)

No. 6 Military Zone, Pa-an District

The enemy's strategic post on Ta-nya-kyo hill where a field medical station and supply dump having food, medicines and ammunition supplies was attacked on 10-4-86 by our combined forces from the 1st,2nd and 7th Brigades and the 101st Bn. The attack lasted for 7 hours starting from 2 p.m. until 9 p.m. All the enemy's barracks and buildings, food and ammunition supply stored for the year were destroyed by shell fire.

Our combined forces from the 19th Bn of the 7th Bde and the 101st Bn attacked the enemy's out-post at La-ka-ma village on 11-4-86. One enemy troop was captured alive and 1 2-inch mortar, 3 G3 rifles, 1 .30 carbine and some ammunition were also captured.

On 11-4-86, troops from the 7th Bde counter attacked the enemy troops who had captured some of the bunkers on a high ground in front of Maela. Our troops captured 3 enemy troops dead and wounded 9 others. All the bunkers were recaptured in addition to capturing 8 rounds of 84 mm recoilless rifle, 800 rounds of .30 carbine, 2,000 rounds of G3 rifle and 3 pieces of torpedo mines.

General Headquarters (GHQ) Area

On 15-4-86 troops from our Special Forces and GHQ Security Forces attacked the enemy on Derlu ridge near Yinbaing on the Salween river. All the enemy troops fled after suffering 10 killed and 4 wounded. One 75mm recoilless rifle, 2 81mm mortars, 1 G2 rifle, 5 .30 carbines, 35 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, 77 81mm mortar shells, 30 hand-grenades, 10 assorted mines and bombs, 20 G3 rifle magazines, 6 carbine magazines, over 50,000 assorted small-arm rounds and a large quantity of military equipment, medicines and food supply were captured. Most of the food supply and military equipment which could not be carried were destroyed by burning.

BATTLE NEWS FROM NDF H.Q

Kachin Independence Army (KIA)


On 14-2-86, C Company of the 3rd KIA Bn attacked the enemy troops from Coy No. 5 of No. 58 Infantry Bn in the 3rd KIA Bn area. The battle lasted for 2 hours after which the enemy troops retreated with their dead and wounded. The enemy suffered 22 dead including 1 major and 1 lieutenant. One private, Hla Aye, was captured alive. Two Browning pistols, 6 .30 carbines, 4 G2 rifles, 4 G3 rifles, 1 M79 grenade launcher and 1 military truck with a quantity of military equipment were captured.

NDF Southern Combined Military Area

A column of NDF southern Combined Force comprising of Mon National Liberation Army and KNLA troops attacked the enemy No. 61 Infantry Bn HQ and Ye town police station on 2-4-86. Many buildings were destroyed and burnt down by shelling. The police commander with 3 other policemen and 3 militia troops were killed and 17 wounded. During the attack, a detachment of the combined force intercepted the reinforcement from Kyon-luang, inflicting a casualty of 4 enemy troops dead and 4 wounded. There was no casualty on our side.

MILITARY ZONES OF KAWTHOOLEI, KAREN REVOLUTIONARY AREA

SHOWING SOME IMPORTANT BATTLES FOUGHT DURING FEB/MAR AND APRIL, 1986



BURMESE HEGEMONISM

Generally, the Burmese have always considered themselves as a race superior to all the other indigenous races of Burma and that they are of the ruling class and the other races are fit only to be their subjects. They class the other indigenous races as savages, primitive, beef-witted and not eligible rule along with them. This true nature of Burmese hegemonism and chauvinism, personified in the most execrable way by the leadership of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), was once again laid open at the fourth "Pyithuluttaw" (People's Assembly) held in Rangoon from November 4 to November 9, 1985.

On that occasion, twenty nine members were elected for the state council (the Upper House) of these, twenty two were Burmese. Only one representative each from some of the indigenous races, namely, the Arakanese, Kachin, Karen, Karenni (Kayah), Chin, Mon and Shan was elected. U San Yu, a Burmese and an ex-army general was elected as the chairman (a position which automatically made him the country's president) while the vice-chairman post went to U Aye Ko, another Burmese and an ex-army personnal. U Maung Maung Kha, also a Burmese, was re-elected as the prime minister of the country, U Sein Lwin, a Burmese, was one of the two deputy prime ministers. The other deputy prime minister was General Kyaw Htin, the present commander-in-chief of Burmese armed forces, who serves concurrently as the defence minister. All ether ministerial and deputy ministerial posts went to the Burmese.

Before the fourth " Pyithuluttaw " was convened, the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), the only party in the country , held its fifth party congress in August. The party congress re-elected U Ne Win, a Burmese, as party chairman. The newly created post of vice-chairman went to U San Yu. The party secretary and joint secretaries and the rest of the seventeen party central executive committee (politburo) members elected were all Burmese.

It is true that the posts of chairmen of the seven state councils (state governments) are given to members of the indigenous races. These "chairmen" are members of the BSPP and they have no power of their own. They are just the Burmese puppets who are doing faithfully whatever the party directs them to do. In fact, they have even to be afraid of the Burmese soldiers operating in their " states." They have very little or no interest in the welfare of their nationals. They are more concerned about the stability of their own positions than the welfare of any body. For example, the " chairman " of the " Karen State " knows very well about the atrocities perpetrated by the barbarous troops of the Burmese army against the Karen nationals in his " state." However, he dare not

speak out against these atrocities for fear of earning the wrath of the Burmese and losing his position.

Burma is a country co-habited and owned by various indigenous races since the dawn of history. All the indigenous races are equally entitled to liberty, equality and social progress as their birth rights. These rights, however, are being denied to the other indigenous races while the Burmese are fully enjoying them. The Burmese created seven false states for seven indigenous races but no rights has been granted to them to decide their own political destiny. While each indigenous is granted a "state", the Burmese take for themselves a large part of the country comprising of seven divisions each of which is about or larger than the size of a state.

Theoretically, Burma is a "Union", but it is a unitary in all the practical aspects. The "states" are not allowed any power of self-government. The Union government, or the Burmese have a monopoly on all the sovereign power of the country.

Even in countries like the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China where there are relatively small populations of the ethnic peoples, a large autonomy for self-government has been granted. In Burma where the total population of ethnic peoples exceeds that of the Burmese, the disproportionately inbalanced structure of power sharing and the resultant persecution of the indigenous peoples by the Burmese has inevitably led to the civil war.

Since the militarists Ne Win and his co-horts came to power, the civil war has been escalated to unprecedented level. Whatever these Burmese hegemonists and chauvinists do, it is the inescapable verdict of history that they shall end in utter defeat like the Nazis and Facists of the by-gone era.

FREEDOM IS FOR THOSE WHO DARE TO FIGHT .
 လွတ်လပ်ရေးသည် တိုက်ရဲသူများအတွက်ဖြစ်သည်
 TO DIE FIGHTING IS BETTER THAN TO LIVE A SLAVE .
 စစ်တိုက်ရုံသာ ဖြစ်သည်။ ထွက်ခွာခြင်းထက် သေခြင်းကောင်းသည်။



Visiting Wangkha front with presents for the troops. In the picture are Mary Ohn(2nd from right),Skaw Ler Taw(Head of Central Organisation Dept.Chief Editor for Thanoohtoo Journal and KNU Bulletin) (4th from right),Thramu Lydia (Vice Chairman of Kawmoora Women's Organisation (6th from left)Rev.U Stila,Kawmoora Buddhist Monasty.

Distributing foodstuffs to the troops at the front.



Distributing Religious Tracts to the troops at the front,

Skaw Ler Taw admonishing troops at Cnin The Gone.



Kawmoora Women's Organisation distributing foods to the troops. (Photo by Min Htoo)

Taking lunch at Kawmoora Monasty after visiting troops at the front. (Photo by Min Htoo)

FEEDING MOKHINGA TO OVER 400 TROOPS AT KAWMOORA FRONT



Standing in front are Mrs Taw Hla, (right) President, and Mrs Tamla Wa (left) Vice President of Kawmoora Women's Organisation. (Photo by Min Htoo)



Some troops taking the Mokhing.



Some returning troops from the front at the feast.



12 porters who arrived Wangkha camp in their escape at Palu front. (Photo by Min Htoo)



The 12 porters were cordially entertained to a breakfast before they are released. (Photo by Min Htoo)




Two young soldiers at the feast.



Naw Nah Bit ,18 years,gave birth on the way. Till now no medicine available for her.



Naw K Prea,17, wounded by mortar bomb splinters in her leg totalling 7 wounds.



Karen children from Le Nya village wearing clothes given by Thai villagers.



4 surrendered enemy personnels who now join KNLA 10Bn. From left to right-Pvt. Aung Soe Win, No 589629 of 17inf. Bn.,Pvt., Ngwe Thein of 101 inf.Bn.,Pvt.Khin Nu of 101 inf. Bn. and Cpl.Kyaw Zaw of 101 inf. battalion.



Mergui/Tavoy District President,Colonel Marvel welcomed the 4 who now join the Karen Revolution with rewards for the arms they brought in, accordingly.



Private Ngwe Thein admitted their enemy 101 infantry Battalion troops actually burnt Eh Eh village(Seen in the picture)